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ABSTRACT
President Biden proposes to revise the federal rulemaking process to advance the values of justice and equity. This analysis offers a practical path
forward by adding an equity test to the efficiency test applied to new federal
regulations by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget. This article explores the feasibility of the proposal with applications to regulation of hazardous air pollutants and drinking water contaminants. The proposal seeks
to advance the interests of low-income Americans in federal rulemaking, a
subgroup that has received little historical priority in the regulatory impact
analyses prepared by federal regulatory agencies.
INTRODUCTION
President Joe Biden has pledged to make equity a cornerstone of his administration. One of his first actions in office was Executive Order 13985,
which calls for policies that advance the interests of “disadvantaged, vulnerable, and marginalized communities.”1 In a related Presidential Memorandum titled “Modernizing Regulatory Review,” President Biden called on the
Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) to propose procedures that consider the “distributional consequences of regulation . . . [on] disadvantaged,
vulnerable, or marginalized communities.”2
It has been over a year since the start of the new administration, but OMB
has not yet taken formal action on this presidential instruction.3 This may be
due in part because the President’s OMB has no Senate-confirmed leadership.4 President Biden’s original nominee for OMB director was not confirmed by the Senate.5 Moreover, the unit within OMB responsible for regulatory-analysis guidelines, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
(“OIRA”), has not received any Senate-confirmed leadership since the start

1

Exec. Order No. 13,985 Sec. 1, 86 Fed. Reg. 7,009 (Jan. 20, 2021).
Memorandum from The White House to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts and Agencies (Jan. 20, 2021),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/20/modernizing-regulatory-review/.
3
Courtney Bublé, Biden’s OMB Nominee Plans to Keep Prioritizing Oversight and Ending Government Shutdowns, GOV’T EXEC.: MGMT. (Feb. 1, 2022), https://www.govexec.com/management/2022/02/priorities-bidens-omb-director-nominee-include-oversight-and-ending-government-shutdowns/361443/.
4
Id.
5
Id. However, another nomination for director and deputy director was recently announced. Brett
Samuels, Biden Taps Shalanda Young to White House Budget Office, THE HILL (Nov. 24, 2021),
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/582955-biden-taps-shalanda-young-to-lead-white-housebudget-office.
2
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of the Biden administration and has not announced a nominee to lead the
unit.6
Another possible explanation for the delayed OIRA response is that the
issues are complex philosophically, scientifically, and politically. President
Bill Clinton issued an executive order that prioritized environmental justice
concerns, an order which was retained by each of Clinton’s successors, both
Republican and Democrat.7 Nevertheless, the reality is that robust literature
indicates that the previous order on environmental justice had little or no effect on the practice of regulatory analysis and rulemaking.8 Environmental
justice has had little impact on rulemaking partly because OIRA has not provided regulators with detailed guidance on incorporating environmental-justice concerns into regulatory analysis and rulemaking.9 Unless, and until, environmental justice finds its way into the practice of “regulatory impact
analysis,”10 we should expect environmental justice concerns to have an insignificant influence on the rulemaking process.11
A well-developed body of legal literature and judicial decisions have highlighted the increasingly important role of benefit-cost analysis in judicial review of agency rulemaking, even when Congress is silent about the role of
such analysis.12 If Congress were to write new legislation that establishes environmental justice as an overriding consideration in regulatory decision
making, effectively trumping benefit-cost analysis in the process, perhaps
then environmental justice could have a major impact. But Congress, not
President Biden, enacts legislation, and there is no groundswell of support
for legislative reform to replace or limit benefit-cost analysis with environmental justice. Thus, if President Biden is to make progress in this arena, it
will be through executive action and improvement of benefit-cost analysis.
This article proposes the incorporation of environmental justice into benefit-cost analysis of new rulemakings. The proposal is applicable to both
6
Bublé, supra note 3; Nancy Cook, Progressives Want One of Their Own as Biden's Regulatory
Gatekeeper, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 17, 2022), https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/progressives-want-one-oftheir-own-as-biden-s-regulatory-gatekeeper-1.1724997.
7
Proclamation No. 12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994).
8
Denis Binder et al., A Survey of Federal Agency Response to President Clinton’s Executive Order
No. 12898 on Environmental Justice, 31 ENV’T L. REP. 11133, 11139 (2001); Carl F. Cranor & Adam M.
Finkel, Toward the Usable Recognition of Individual Benefits and Costs in Regulatory Analysis and Governance, 12 REGUL. AND GOVERNANCE 131, 131 (2018); Elizabeth Glass Geltman et al., Beyond Baby
Steps: An Empirical Study of the Impact of Environmental Justice Executive Order 12898, 39 FAM. AND
CMTY. HEALTH 143, 143 (2016); Lisa A. Robinson et al., Attention to Distribution in U.S. Regulatory
Analyses, 10 REV. ENV’T ECON. AND POL’Y 308, 308 (2016).
9
JACK LIENKE ET AL., INST. FOR POL’Y INTEGRITY, MAKING REGULATIONS FAIR: HOW COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN PROMOTE EQUITY AND ADVANCE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE i (2021).
10
“Regulatory impact analysis” is the bureaucratic term for benefit-cost analysis.
11
Id. at 2–3.
12
John D. Graham, Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 395, 398–402 (2008).
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deregulatory and regulatory actions, and it draws on my experience as Administrator of OIRA (2001-2006) and as a teacher of benefit-cost analysis.
Section II of this article amplifies a recommendation I made soon after serving as OIRA administrator.13
Section I traces the intellectual underpinnings of benefit-cost analysis and
environmental justice, as the two fields developed independently without any
integration. Section II explains why a focus on the well-being of poor14
Americans is particularly compelling against the backdrop of the benefit-cost
calculus, a focus that would be consistent with President Biden’s agenda.
Section III presents this article’s proposal for integration of environmental
justice into benefit-cost analysis and compares the proposal to a more fundamental reform, an income-weighted social welfare function. Section IV discusses two case studies focusing on clean air and safe drinking water that
demonstrate how the proposal might work in practice. Ultimately this analysis concludes with a discussion of the proposal’s technical, legal, and political
feasibility.
I. FOUNDATIONS OF BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE
If we are to combine benefit-cost analysis and environmental justice, it is
necessary to understand the historical underpinnings, assumptions, and limitations of the two concepts. This analysis argues that both concepts have appeal and that, if merged creatively, the composite concept can address some
deficiencies of the other tool.
A. Benefit-Cost Analysis
In the 1930s, the British economists Nicholas Kaldor and John Hicks
worked independently on the same question: how do we determine whether
a new government policy has enhanced social welfare?15 They proposed the
same answer with only subtle differences in approach.16 Their work has been
described as the “Kaldor-Hicks efficiency test” or the “Kaldor-Hicks hypothetical compensation test.”17 Prior to Kaldor and Hicks, the most promising
idea was advanced by the Italian philosopher, sociologist, and economist
13

Id. at 520.
My understanding is that the term “poor” has a negative connotation in some contexts. That is
certainly not my intention in this article. I am referring to persons living with incomes below the federally
defined poverty threshold.
15
See RICHARD E. JUST ET AL., THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC POLICY: A PRACTICAL
APPROACH TO PROJECT AND POLICY EVALUATION 32 (2004).
16
For a textbook presentation of the Kaldor-Hicks test, including citations to original sources, see
id. at 32–48.
17
Id. at 32.
14
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Vilfredo Pareto in 1906.18 He suggested that a new government policy is efficient if it at least benefits some people without disadvantaging others.19 A
society is considered “Pareto optimal” if there are no more Pareto-improving
policies available, meaning that any further change in policy would make at
least one person worse off.20 Pareto assumed that individuals are normally
the best judge of their own interests and are therefore qualified to determine
whether a proposal would serve their interests.21 This is called the principle
of consumer sovereignty, which similarly underpins the Kaldor-Hicks test.22
The Pareto principle is highly restrictive because it does not permit any losers.23
The restrictions of Pareto’s principle inspired the creation of the KaldorHicks test.24 Kaldor and Hicks rejected Pareto’s principle because they
wanted to encourage policies that are good for society, even if some citizens
would lose.25 They sought a more expansive definition of societal efficiency
that would tolerate some degree of loss in exchange for compelling gains.26
Thus, Kaldor and Hicks proposed a hypothetical compensation test: if the
gainers from a policy gain enough that they could, hypothetically, compensate the losers and still be better off, then the proposed policy is an efficiency
improvement.27 The compensation of losers, usually considered in monetary
terms, must be generous enough that the losers no longer feel worse off due
to the proposed policy.28 After the hypothetical compensation is paid, the surplus in gains that remains is considered a measure of the net gain in social
efficiency from the proposed policy.29
It is critical to note that, for purposes of the Kaldor-Hicks test, the compensation does not take place; it is purely hypothetical and serves as an
18
See generally VILFREDO PARETO, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Ann S. Schwier and Alfred
N Page eds., Ann S. Schwier trans., Augustus M. Kelley Publishers 1971) (1906).
19
See id. at 451–52.
20
Most would agree that Pareto-improving policies merit adoption but one can even object to the
Pareto principle on equity grounds. AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS & ECONOMICS 32 (1987). (“A state can
be Pareto optimal with some people in extreme misery and others rolling in luxury, so long as the miserable cannot be made better off without cutting into the luxury of the rich.”).
21
See JUST ET AL., supra note 15 at 32; see also John Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative
Law and Economics, UNIV. PENN. LAW REV. 408–10 (2008).
22
LEE S. FRIEDMAN, THE MICROECONOMICS OF PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS 24 (2002).
23
Graham, supra note 21 at 410–11.
24
Id. at 408–10.
25
de Pony Sum, The Effects of Kaldor-Hicks Improvements In An Oligarchical Society, MEDIUM
(Apr. 13, 2019), https://medium.com/@sumdepony/the-effects-of-kaldor-hicks-compensation-in-an-oligarchical-society-102e318d502b.
26
Bostani Mostafa & Alireza Malekpoor, Critical Analysis of Kaldor-Hicks Criterion, with Respect
to Moral Values, Social Policy Making and Incoherence, 6(7) ADVANCES IN ENV’T BIOLOGY 2032, 2032
(2012).
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
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analytical construct.30 If, however, the compensation is paid, then the proposed policy passes the stricter Pareto test.31 The most obvious concern is the
uncompensated losers: How is it fair to deny the losers compensation based
on the size of projected gains for the winners?32
The defenders of the Kaldor-Hicks test offer two, albeit not entirely satisfying, responses. First, they contend that they are defending a concept of
overall efficiency in the economy, not justice or overall societal good.33 In
the 1930s, some economists believed that concepts such as fairness and justice were matters for philosophy and ethics, entirely outside the purview of
economics.34 Just as physicists do not generally stray into the territory of biology, some economists were reluctant to stray into philosophy.35 Second,
defenders of the Kaldor-Hicks test envision numerous policy being adopted
over time, where the winners and losers would not be the same on each proposal.36 For example, a person that loses on Policy A may be a winner on
Policy B or Policy C. If there is sufficient mixing of winners and losers over
numerous policy decisions, then the vast majority of citizens will become net
gainers under the Kaldor-Hicks test.37 This is called the “repeated application” or “long-run argument” for the Kaldor-Hicks test.38 The repeated-application argument is similar to the successful arguments economists have made
to support airline deregulation, antitrust regulation, and free trade. In each
case, there are losers from a single policy decision (e.g., some large established airlines went bankrupt because of the near-term competitive pressure
of deregulation), but, in the long run, most people experienced net gains (e.g.,
as new airlines entered the market and offered consumers lower fares and
better-quality service).39
Soon after the Kaldor-Hicks test was proposed, it was challenged because
it ignored the distribution of gains and losses.40 One of the harshest critics of

30

Id.
See MATTHEW D. ADLER, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF L. & SOC’Y: AMERICAN AND GLOBAL
PERSPECTIVES 305–07 (David S. Clark ed., 2007).
32
My students are often stunned to learn that the Kaldor-Hicks test –simple and fragile as it is–
represents the normative theoretical foundation of benefit-cost analysis.
33
Stephen Coate, An Efficiency Approach to the Evaluation of Policy Changes, 110 THE ECON. J.
437, 441–42 (2000).
34
See Timothy Taylor, Economics and Morality, FIN. & DEV. 34, 34 (June 2014).
35
Hicks was neutral as to whether compensation should actually be paid. John R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics. 49 THE ECON. J. 696, 711–12 (1939).
36
Graham, supra note 21 at 414–17.
37
A. Mitchell Polinsky, Probabilistic Compensation Criteria, 86 Q. J. OF ECON. 407, 416 (1972).
38
Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure: A Welfarist Theory of Regulation, 28 FLA.
ST. UNIV. L. REV. 241, 252 (2000).
39
For a discussion of the repeated-application rationale for the Kaldor-Hicks test, with references to
foundational literature, see Graham, supra note 21 at 414–19.
40
Id. at 420–22.
31
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the test was a former doctoral student of Hicks named I.M.D. Little.41 He
argued that the Kaldor-Hicks test is unpersuasive unless it is accompanied by
a distributional test that ensures fairness.42 He did not propose a specific distributional test, but he stimulated numerous theories of distributional fairness.43 The combination of the Kaldor-Hicks test and an unspecified distributional test became known as “Little’s test.”44 Unfortunately, no consensus
emerged regarding how the distributional test should be specified or implemented.45 Instead, the economics literature veered off into a multi-decade
search for mathematical social-welfare functions that incorporated both efficiency and equity.46 This literature has been theoretically exciting and includes many “impossibility” theorems but has had no practical effect on the
practice of benefit-cost analysis.47
More recently, a different argument has been used to neutralize the distributional objection to the Kaldor-Hicks test.48 Suppose there are persistent
losers from multiple applications of the Kaldor-Hicks test. In that case, those
losers should be compensated on a lump-sum basis rather than stalling every
policy decision due to concerns for its losers. It has also been shown that it is
more efficient to solve distributional problems through tax and income-security programs than to sacrifice some of the efficiency of regulatory policies.49
A weakness in the income-security argument is that politicians have been
slow to accomplish social justice in America. What happens in regulatory
policy if Congress does not use tax and income-security policy to protect the
interests of the poor? Suppose there are persistent losers from regulations,
but Congress does not supply lump-sum compensation for their losses? The
lack of sufficient answers to these two questions has been underscored by the
environmental justice literature.
B. Environmental Justice

41

See I.M.D. LITTLE, A CRITIQUE OF WELFARE ECON. 90–91 (2d ed. 1957).
See id.; see also Kenneth J. Arrow, Little’s Critique of Welfare Economics, 41 AM. ECON. REV.
923, 923 (1951).
43
See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE & INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963).
44
See I.M.D. Little, Welfare Criteria, Distribution, and Cost-Benefit Analysis, in ECON. HUM.
WELFARE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF TIBOR SCITOVSKY 125, 131 (Michael J. Boskin ed., 1979).
45
Graham, supra note 21 at 422.
46
See id. at 420–21.
47
See generally Arrow, supra note 43; see generally YEW-KWANG NG, SOC. WELFARE AND ECON.
POL’Y 79, 83 (1990); Amartya Sen, The Possibility of Social Choice, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 349, 351 (1999).
48
See LITTLE, supra note 41 at 91.
49
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in
Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667, 674 (1994); David A. Weisbach, Distributionally
Weighted Cost-Benefit Analysis: Welfare Economics Meets Organizational Design, 7 J. OF LEGAL
ANALYSIS 151, 152 (2015).
42
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It is debatable how far back one should go to describe the quest for justice.
In modern times, one could point to the reasoning and protests of Mahatma
Gandhi of India prior to World War II or to the philosophical writings of Harvard professor John Rawls in the 1970s, who emphasized society’s moral
obligation to protect the interests of those in society’s most vulnerable populations.50 The contemporary exposition of environmental justice begins with
the investigative work of the United Church of Christ and the writings of
sociologist and activist Robert D. Bullard.51
The United Church of Christ sponsored the Commission for Racial Justice,
which uncovered and documented the disproportionate exposure of African
Americans to toxic wastes in the United States.52 The Commission for Racial
Justice published a report in 1987 that drew attention to the roles of poverty
and racism in determining who bears the burden of environmental pollution.53
Bullard followed in 1990 with the first edition of Dumping in Dixie, a vivid
account of several southern communities where African Americans incur a
disproportionate share of the exposure and disease from exposure to hazardous waste.54 The wastes are not typically generated by those exposed; rather,
they are generated by the middle-class and upper-class lifestyles of predominantly white America.55 Within a decade, the literature on environmental
justice exploded, reaching into virtually every aspect of environmental quality: outdoor air pollution, indoor air pollution, surface water pollution,
groundwater pollution, contamination of drinking water, and even the impacts of global climate change.56 To advance the cause of environmental justice, the National Research Council of the National Academies made numerous recommendations for improved research, education, and public policy.57

50
See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, 75–78 (1971) (development of the difference
principle); Harrison Jacobs, Gandhi’s 1940 Letter to Adolf Hitler: Seek Peace or Someone Will ‘Beat You
With Your Own Weapon,’ BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.businessinsider.com/gandhis-1940letter-to-adolf-hitler-2015-4.
51
See infra, Section I.A.
52
See COMM’N FOR RACIAL JUST.: UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN THE
UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF
COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES ix (1987).
53
See id. at ix–xi.
54
See generally ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL
QUALITY (Routledge 3d ed. 2018).
55
Id. at 7.
56
The Economics of Environmental Justice, with Samuel Stolper and Catherine Hausman, RES.
RADIO (Mar. 3, 2020), https://www.resources.org/resources-radio/economics-environmental-justice-samuel-stolper-and-catherine-hausman/ [hereinafter The Economics of Environmental Justice]; see H.
SPENCER BANZHAF ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: ESTABLISHING CAUSAL RELATIONSHIPS 377
(2019).
57
INST. OF MED., TOWARDS ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: RESEARCH, EDUCATION, AND HEALTH
POLICY NEEDS (1999), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/23035313/; see BANZHAF, ET AL., supra note 57
at 377.
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Even in the absence of racism, basic economics would predict that poor
Americans will experience elevated exposure to pollution.58 Households with
higher incomes buy access to cleaner communities, neighborhoods, foods,
products, and transport vehicles.59 Systemic racism, expressed through both
market and governmental mechanisms, causes people of color to experience
elevated rates of pollution exposure.60 The interaction of poverty and race is
therefore expected to create disproportionately higher rates of pollution exposure and pollution-related disease. The good news is that some environmental regulatory programs, even though they were not designed to accomplish justice, have diminished the differences in pollution exposure between
Black and white populations. This has been shown quite clearly using satellite data of human exposures to particulate air pollution before and after the
implementation of the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) new particulate air quality standard.61 As encouraging as this example is, one cannot
generalize from the Clean Air Act experience because each environmental
regulatory program is designed and enforced differently.
In the field of environmental regulation, President Clinton issued an executive order to promote environmental justice.62 The EPA has had a standing
advisory committee on environmental justice for years.63 Nonetheless, by
2008 little progress on environmental justice had occurred.64 The EPA under
President Obama made progress with an explicit plan on environmental justice; implementation of the plan was uneven.65 An in-depth review of the
EPA’s entire 50-year history concluded that environmental justice did not
receive sustained attention at the agency, especially with respect to regulatory
development and enforcement.66 Some authors argue that the neglect of environmental justice may reflect the origins of the modern environmental
movement, which was dominated by highly educated and privileged white

58

The Economics of Environmental Justice, supra note 57.
Id.
60
Id.
61
Janet Currie et al., What Caused Racial Disparities in Particulate Exposure to Fall? New Evidence
From the Clean Air Act and Satellite-Based Measures of Air Quality 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 26659, 2021).
62
Exec. Order No. 12898, 59 Fed. Reg. 32 (Feb. 16, 1994).
63
For a review of previous federal efforts to promote environmental justice, see Richard L. Revesz,
Regulation and Distribution, 93 NYU L. REV. 1489, 1525 (2018).
64
Robert D. Bullard et al., Toxic Wastes and Race at Twenty: Why Race Still Matters After All of
These Years, 38 ENV’T L. 371, 377 (2008).
65
See FAILED PROMISES: EVALUATING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (David M. Konisky ed. 2015).
66
DAVID M KONISKY, FIFTY YEARS AT THE US ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY:
PROGRESS, RETRENCHMENT, AND OPPORTUNITIES 547 (A. James Barnes et al. eds., 2021).
59
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people.67 Efforts to foster collaboration between organized environmentalists
and social justice advocates were too limited.68
A key question, then, is how to incorporate concerns about justice into the
formal regulatory impact analyses used to design and support regulatory alternatives.69 Until the Biden administration, the conventional view was that
environmental justice must be separate from benefit-cost analysis for several
reasons.70 First, there was no obvious place for justice in a tool of social efficiency. Second, few environmental justice advocates were trained in benefitcost analysis.71 And lastly, some of the underlying assumptions of benefitcost analysis seemed irreconcilable with the analysis; for instance, the common measure of environmental benefit, expressed through consumer willingness to pay for the environmental improvement, appeared hostile to the interests of communities with relatively little ability to pay.72 To its credit, the
Biden administration is demanding a more justice-sensitive approach to the
benefit-cost analysis of regulatory alternatives.73
II. THE CASE FOR A FOCUS ON IMPOVERISHED AMERICANS
Like many statements of political priority, the Biden equity agenda refers
broadly, without explicit definition, to “disadvantaged, vulnerable, and marginal communities.”74 This section argues that a modest and useful place to
start is protecting poor people from ill-considered rulemakings, a focus that
is certainly consistent with the Biden agenda.75

67
See Jedediah Purdy, Environmentalism’s Racist History, NEW YORKER (Aug. 13, 2015),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/environmentalisms-racist-history.
68
PAUL SABIN, PUBLIC CITIZENS: THE ATTACK ON BIG GOVERNMENT AND THE REMAKING OF
AMERICAN LIBERALISM 104–05 (2021).
69
H. Spencer Banzhaf, Regulatory Impact Analyses of Environmental Justice Effects 6 (Nat. Ctr. for
Env’t Econ., Working Paper No. 10-08, 2010); Jonathan I. Levy, Accounting for Health Risk Inequality
in Regulatory Impact Analysis: Barriers and Opportunities, 41 RISK ANALYSIS 610, 611–12 (2021); see
also Cass R. Sunstein, Some Costs & Benefits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 DAEDALUS 208, 208 (2021).
70
Jorge Roman-Romero & Mariana Munoz, Unweighted Cost-Benefit Analysis Under Arbitrariness
& Environmental Justice Principles, VT. J. OF ENV’T L., https://vjel.vermontlaw.edu/unweighted-costbenefit-analysis-under-arbitrariness-environmental-justice-principles (last visited Apr. 1, 2022).
71
Morgan Lewis, President Biden’s ‘Modernizing Regulatory Review’ Memorandum, JD SUPRA
(Mar. 1, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/president-biden-s-modernizing-1619702/.
72
Id.
73
Roman-Romero & Munoz, supra note 70.
74
Id.
75
President Biden seeks specifically protection of “persons adversely affected by persistent poverty
or inequality.” FY 2022-2026 EPA STRATEGIC PLAN DRAFT 38 (Envntl. Prot. Agency, 2021),
https://www.epa.gov/system/files/documents/2021-10/fy-2022-2026-epa-draft-strategic-plan.pdf.
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The federal government already has two formal measurements of poverty.76 The first is the official Census definition, in use since the 1960s, and
the second is a supplemental measure that accounts for some of the deficiencies in the official measure.77 In 2020, a family of four was considered “poor”
by the Census Bureau if its household income was less than $26,496.78 The
official Census measure does not adjust for geographical differences in the
cost of living and for in-kind sources of income, such as Medicaid and SNAP
food benefits.
Both Census measures suggest that more than 10% of Americans are
poor.79 However, the official measure is largely comprised of rural residents
and children, while the supplemental measure is comprised of relatively more
urban residents and the elderly.80 According to the official measure, 11.4%
of Americans were poor in 2020, up from 10.5% in 2019.81 This is the first
increase in the U.S. poverty rate since the Great Recession of 2007-2009, as
the poverty rate was steadily declining until the onset of the COVID-19 epidemic.82 In absolute numbers, 37.2 million Americans experienced poverty
in 2020, though many of those people moved in and out of poverty during
the year.83
One of the advantages of using poverty as a focal point for regulatory analysis of justice is that the U.S. poverty measure highlights the needs of people
of color. According to the official measure, the rate of poverty among Black
people, 19.5%, and Hispanic people, 17.0%, is much higher than the rate of
poverty among non-Hispanic white people, 8.2%.84 A focus on the poor does
not address racism per se, but many of the victims of racism, especially those
unable to combat racism, are poor. By protecting poor people from bad regulations, regulators would protect people of color.
Another reason to focus on poverty is that the case for special regulatory
protection based on race alone is less convincing. Certainly, the protection of
middle-class and upper-class Hispanic and Black people may not be as compelling as the case for protecting poor white people. The heads of poor white
76
EMILY A. SHRIDER ET AL., INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2020 1 (U.S. Census
Bureau, 2021).
77
Id.
78
Poverty Thresholds for 2020 by Size of Family and Number of Related Children Under 18 Years,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, www2.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/tables/time-series/historical-povertythresholds/thresh20.xls (last revised Jan. 19, 2022).
79
SHRIDER ET AL., supra note 76 at 1.
80
KRISTIN SEEFELDT & JOHN D. GRAHAM, AMERICA’S POOR AND THE GREAT RECESSION 26 (Ind.
Univ. Press 2013) (showing different measures of poverty).
81
SHRIDER ET AL., supra note 76 at 1.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
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households have some similar statistical tendencies as the heads of poor
Black and Hispanic households: low levels of education, unstable employment, and impaired family structure.85 In the Rawlsian formulation of justice
as fairness, the priority is protecting the least advantaged segment of the population.86 It is easier to defend the poor as a least-advantaged group than to
defend any other group that includes middle-class and upper-class Americans.
This article focuses on impoverished Americans as the focal point for justice analysis. Nonetheless, the principles and procedures discussed apply to
any subset of the “disadvantaged, vulnerable, and marginal communities,”
assuming the subset is well-defined enough to be measured objectively. A
more focused definition of poverty would exclude episodically poor people,
meaning those who are poor for only a short period and isolate those who are
persistently poor.87 Alternatively, one could broaden the coverage to low-income Americans living within 150% or 200% of the official poverty line.88
Many public assistance programs take this approach because it is very difficult for a family of four to survive with an income at the poverty line.89
III. A POVERTY-FOCUSED PROPOSAL
When a new rulemaking is proposed, regardless of whether it is an act of
regulation or deregulation, OIRA requires agencies to show that the overall
society-wide benefits justify the costs of the proposed regulation.90 This is
the Kaldor-Hicks test. This article proposes a new, second component of
OIRA review. This new component would be a Kaldor-Hicks test considering only the costs and benefits experienced by poor people. This component
will be satisfied if the benefits to the poor justify the costs to the poor. 91 If
the regulatory agency persuades OIRA that both Kaldor-Hicks tests are favorable for a proposal, then the proposal should be approved. If the agency

85

Id. at 19.
See generally RAWLS, supra note 50.
87
Stephanie Cellini et al., The Dynamics of Poverty in the United States: A Review of Data, Methods,
and Findings, 27 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 40–46 (2008) (explaining that 50% of poverty spells are
less than a year, 75% less than 4 years; female heads of households and blacks experience disproportionately long spells of poverty; long spells of poverty are related to employment problems, poor health, low
levels of education, and family disruption).
88
SEEFELDT & GRAHAM, supra note 80 at 20.
89
See id. at 59–61 (showing examples of assistance programs).
90
Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).
91
Here, I build on a suggestion I made in 2008, soon after serving in the George W. Bush administration. Graham, supra note 21 at 515–34.
86
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reports that both Kaldor-Hicks tests are unfavorable, OIRA rejection of the
proposal should be considered.92
A challenging issue arises when the results of the two Kaldor-Hicks tests
are conflicting. If societal net benefits are positive, but net benefits to the
poor are negative, the proposal has a justice/inequity flaw.93 In that case,
OIRA should advise the agency to revise the proposal in ways that would
eliminate or reverse the injustice. This might occur by redesigning the regulation or offering a public subsidy to poor communities that bear costs or
risks due to the regulation.94 Also difficult is the case where the regulation
has negative net benefits for society but offers positive net benefits to the
poor.
One is tempted to argue that justice demands that this regulation be approved since it presumably passes the Rawlsian “justice as fairness” principle
by advancing the interests of the least well-off members of society. However,
there are two dangers to this line of thinking. First, a costly regulation that
does nothing to advance the statutory mission of the regulatory agency could
potentially offer positive net benefits to the poor. If the statutory mission is
not advanced, the regulation will be vulnerable to judicial reversal on appeal.
Second, insofar as the rule is simply a redistributional measure,95 one should
consider whether it would be more effective and efficient to help the poor
directly through the tax and income-security system. If the political will exists to enact and tolerate a redistributional regulation that helps the poor at
the expense of society, the political will might also exist, at least in some
cases, to legislate a change in tax or income security system to accomplish
the same or even greater gain for the poor. Nonetheless, there may be cases
where it is sensible to enact a regulation that has large net benefits for the
poor but only small negative net benefits for society. This might occur when
the poor experience most of the risk-reduction benefits of the rulemaking, but
do not incur any of the costs of the rule.
In contrast to this article’s proposal, a more fundamental change–which
has been implemented to some extent in the United Kingdom–introduces
weights on benefits and costs based on the income level of the affected

92
Rejection would not be automatic because, for example, some rulemaking proposals – even bad
ones – are required by statute.
93
Societal net benefits are defined as the benefits minus costs.
94
Revesz, supra note 63 at 1489 (describing the POWER+ program, a model funding initiative that
sought to mitigate the economic burdens coal mining communities would suffer as a result of the Clean
Power Plan).
95
A “redistributional measure” is a Robin Hood-esque effort to take from the rich to give to the poor.
Redistributive, CAMBRIDGE BUS. ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/redistributive (last visited Apr. 1, 2022).
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citizen.96 The weights would be progressive in nature, which means that $1
in benefit to the poor receives greater social weight than $1 in benefit to the
wealthy.97 Both the costs and benefits to the poor receive greater weight than
the costs and benefits to the wealthy. Moreover, benefits and costs to the
middle class would receive greater weight than benefits and costs to the upper-income class. This is sometimes referred to as “weighted benefit-cost
analysis,” distinguishable from the standard Kaldor-Hicks analysis, sometimes called “unweighted benefit-cost analysis.”98
The fundamental change in the Kaldor-Hicks analysis proposed by Professor Matthew Adler has several advantages.99 First, it reflects the modern
conception of societal well-being, which posits that well-being is a function
of both the average level and the distribution of well-being in society.100 Societies with more equal distributions of well-being may be more stable and
functional, in addition to being more just societies.101 Second, the fundamental change does not have the sharp distinction between the poor and non-poor
that this article proposes. Whenever the government tries to establish bright
lines, there will be difficulties and controversies about people who reside near
that bright line. The fundamental change has no bright lines since the weights
are a continuous, gradual function of household income.
Despite the advantages of the income-weighted alternative, this article's
proposal has practical advantages, and is more legally and politically feasible.
From a practical perspective, a regulatory analyst will find it more tractable
to collect information on the impacts of regulation on poor people than to
collect information on the impacts of every income group in society. The analytic dimensions grow further if the Biden administration also wants weights
for different subsets of the “disadvantaged, vulnerable and marginal” communities. The Census Bureau already has established measures of poverty

96
Zachary Liscow, Equity in Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, L. & POL. ECON. PROJECT (Oct. 4,
2021), https://lpeproject.org/blog/equity-in-regulatory-cost-benefit-analysis/.
97
The term “progressive” here is a term of art in the public finance literature. A progressive tax is
one that consumes a higher percentage of income at higher income levels than at lower income levels.
Progressive Tax, HIGHER ROCK EDUC. & LEARNING, INC., https://www.higherrockeducation.org/glossary-of-terms/progressive-tax (last visited Apr. 1, 2022).
98
I don’t encourage my students to use such terms because there are implicit weights in the Kaldor
Hicks test. Income levels influence the measurement of benefits and costs in traditional benefit-cost analysis, which is why some scholars want to shift to a metric other than dollars such as happiness or qualityadjusted life years. A deeper discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this article.
99
See generally ADLER, supra note 31; MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER. NEW
FOUNDATIONS FOR COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006).
100
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 968 (2001)
(defining welfare broadly to include levels of individual well-being and the distribution of well-being
among citizens).
101
RICHARD WILKINSON & KATE PICKETT, THE SPIRIT LEVEL: WHY GREATER EQUALITY MAKES
SOCIETIES STRONGER 5–10 (Bloomsbury Press 2010) (2009).
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regulatory analysts can use.102 Since Rawlsian justice focuses on the least
advantaged segment of society, we should not add any more complexity to
the regulatory analysis than is necessary to accomplish justice. Legally, it
could be argued that unelected bureaucrats in the executive branch may not
specify explicit weights for different groups in society without explicit legislative authorization.103 The odds of judicial reversal seem high without legislative authorization of such a sweeping change.
Finally, from a political perspective, it seems needlessly controversial to
engage in a divisive deliberation about how much weight should be allocated
to the middle class versus the rich and the very rich. Indeed, so much political
capital could be expended on specifying proper weights for the huge range
of non-poor that the political system might not devote sufficient attention to
the weights for the poor. This concern is underscored if the Biden administration focuses not just on the poor but on other segments of the disadvantaged,
vulnerable and marginalized communities in America.
IV. CASE STUDIES OF CLEAN AIR AND SAFE DRINKING WATER
This section presents two case studies on how this article’s proposal might
work in practice. The cases illustrate the practical operation of the new poverty test, as well as the new information requirements that agencies must satisfy to implement the poverty test. These cases are of contemporary interest
to the Biden administration and the Congress because they are now working
on these issues.
A. Reducing Tailpipe Pollution from New Cars and Light Trucks
In its current regulatory analysis, the EPA examines the society-wide benefits of reducing air pollution from motor vehicles. 104 It compares those benefits to the compliance costs of adding pollution-control equipment to cars.
105
The EPA does not currently analyze whether the impacts of the tailpipe
standards on the poor are favorable or unfavorable, nor does it collect regular
data on pollution exposure by income status.106 This is because the pollution
102
EMILY A. SHRIDER ET AL., U.S. DEPT' COMM., INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES:
2020 23 (2021), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2021/demo/p60273.pdf.
103
Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2262 (2001).
104
See OFF. AIR QUALITY PLAN. STANDARDS, U.S. EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE
PROPOSED EMISSION GUIDELINES FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS FROM EXISTING ELECTRIC
UTILITY GENERATING UNITS; REVISIONS TO EMISSION GUIDELINE IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS;
REVISIONS TO NEW SOURCE REVIEW PROGRAM, ES-10–ES-20 (2018), https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/2018-08/documents/utilities_ria_proposed_ace_2018-08.pdf.
105
See generally id. at ES-5.
106
Kylie Conrad & John D. Graham, The Benefits and Costs of Automobile Regulations for LowIncome Americans, 12 J. BENEFIT COST ANALYSIS 518, 525 (2021).
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data are merely collected for compliance purposes.107 The EPA sets the same
air quality standards for all communities regardless of income status.108
The good news is that public health researchers have begun to make progress in understanding the incidence of pollution exposure and adverse health
effects among low-income people.109 Since the urban poor often live near
roadways, where rent and property values are lower, they inhale relatively
more of some pollutants that are emitted directly from tailpipes.110 There is
also some evidence that low-income people are more biologically susceptible
to pollution-related diseases because of their greater baseline rates of cardiopulmonary diseases and the stresses of life in poverty that accelerate chronic
diseases’ progression.111
Agencies do not know much about the preferences of low-income people
regarding clean air and the health risks that follow air pollution. Specifically,
information is needed about how much low-income people care about significant improvement in air quality compared to other advantages in life they
could purchase with their constrained income. If the costs of controlling air
pollution from motor vehicles are not incurred by the poor, then acquiring
this preference information is not critical. A regulatory analyst could work
with the simplified assumption that poor Americans value a given reduction
in health risk the same as middle-income Americans do.
Who incurs the cost of installing pollution-control equipment on new motor vehicles? A naïve answer is that automobile manufacturers incur the costs
since they are required to comply with the standards. Insofar as all companies
in the industry incur compliance costs, it is likely that most of the costs are
passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices for new cars.112 Private
passenger vehicles are crucial to meeting the daily transport needs of the
poor.113 Public transit systems in many U.S. cities are inadequate, and many
poor people live in rural areas where cars are a necessity. Access to a car is
107

Id.
Id. at 520.
109
See Yan Wang et al., Estimating Causal Effects of Long-Term PM2.5 Exposure on Mortality in New
Jersey, 124 ENV’T HEALTH PERSPS. 1182, 1182 (2016) (identifying negative effects of long-term PM2.5
exposure in low-income individuals).
110
DAVID REICHMUTH, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS: FACT SHEET: INEQUITABLE EXPOSURE
TO AIR POLLUTION FROM VEHICLES IN CALIFORNIA: WHO BEARS THE BURDEN? 7 (2019); Janet Currie &
Reed Walker, Traffic Congestion and Infant Health: Evidence from E-Z Pass, 3 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED
ECON. 65, 68 (2011).
111
See Quan Di et al., Association of Short-term Exposure to Air Pollution with Mortality in Older
Adults, 318 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2446, 2452, 2454 (2017) (identifying some of the factors that may cause
at-risk populations to be more susceptible to increased PM2.5-related mortality rates).
112
Anne Gron & Deborah L. Swenson, Cost Pass-Through in the U.S. Automobile Market, 82 REV.
ECON. & STAT. 316, 323 (2000).
113
ROLF PENDALL ET AL., WHAT IF CITIES COMBINED CAR-BASED SOLUTIONS WITH TRANSIT TO
IMPROVE ACCESS TO OPPORTUNITY 2 (2016).
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strongly correlated to educational progress, employment access, and higher
earnings for the poor.114 About 40% of poor households own two or more
cars, about 40% have one car, and the remaining 20% have no car.115 Since
the poor cannot usually afford new cars, they rely primarily on used vehicles.116
The EPA does not currently have a rigorous understanding of how higher
prices on new vehicles impact the prices of used vehicles. There is a strong
historical correlation between new and used car prices, suggesting that higher
prices for new cars may elevate prices for used cars.117 This information is
crucial to understanding how new car standards impact the poor. If the poor
experience higher prices for their used cars due to regulations on new cars,
then those price burdens need to be weighed against the health and other benefits of diminished pollution exposure due to cleaner cars.
In summary, it is feasible for the EPA to conduct a benefit-cost analysis of
tailpipe pollution standards from the perspective of the poor. It seems likely
that the standards deliver significant health improvements for the poor, but
the EPA needs to collect systematic data on pollution exposure by household
income status. Additionally, new information needs to be collected on how
much used-car prices are impacted by new-car regulations, and how much
the poor care about air quality compared to other goods in life. This article
argues the government will do the poor no favors if it makes cars so expensive that the poor cannot afford them, even if the expensive cars are “cleaner.”
B. Drinking Water Quality
Access to safe drinking water is a disproportionate challenge for the
poor.118 Both the urban and rural poor incur elevated exposures to certain
drinking-water contaminants.119 As exemplified by the Flint, Michigan lead
crisis, lead in drinking water is likely a problem experienced disproportionately by poor urban residents.120 Higher-income residents are more likely to
have newer, lead-free piping systems or have their lead-based piping systems
maintained on a regular basis.121 Arsenic in drinking water is primarily a
114

Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 5.
116
Id. at 2.
117
Conrad & Graham, supra note 106 at 540–42.
118
J. Tom Mueller & Steven Gasteyer, The Widespread and Unjust Drinking Water and Clean Water
Crisis in the United States, 12 NATURE COMMC’NS 1, 2, 4 (2021).
119
Id. at 5; Water Color: Water Sector Reform #5: Environmental Justice, MANNY TEODORO (Sept.
17, 2019), https://mannyteodoro.com/?p=1209.
120
Water Color: Water Sector Reform #5: Environmental Justice, supra note 119.
121
See JAMES SALTZMAN, SAFE DRINKING WATER, FIFTY YEARS AT THE US ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY: PROGRESS, RETRENCHMENT, AND OPPORTUNITIES, 211, 211–14, (A. James
Barnes, John D. Graham & David M. Konisky eds., 2011) (discussing the water crisis in Flint, Michigan).
115

Published by UR Scholarship Repository, 2022

17

Richmond Public Interest Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [2022], Art. 6

166

RICHMOND PUBLIC INTEREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXV:iii

problem in rural America, where wealthier residents shy away from buying
homes in areas with high naturally-occurring levels of arsenic in drinking
water.122 Safe drinking water moreover improves health outcomes.123
The EPA performs society-wide benefit-cost analysis of new drinking-water standards and separate affordability analyses for small water systems.
However, affordability analysis focuses exclusively on households with median household income in the US.124 In other words, the EPA does not undertake affordability or benefit-cost analyses for the poor.125
Both lead and arsenic in drinking water are associated with health risks.
Lead exerts neurological effects on exposed children, while arsenic is associated with certain kinds of cancer.126 Since poor Americans experience elevated exposures to both lead and arsenic, the health improvements from lead
and arsenic control should be larger for the poor.127 The willingness of Americans to pay for safer drinking water needs to be studied carefully, as poor
households struggle to pay the cost of basic necessities such as food, housing,
and transport.128 More precise information about the monetary benefits of
safer drinking water for the poor is needed.
It may seem harsh or cruel to force the poor to choose between safe drinking water and safe food, housing, and transportation. This tradeoff does not
need to be addressed if the EPA can find a structural solution that provides
safe drinking water at no cost to the poor. However, if the EPA rulemaking
is a typical regulation of water utilities, the poor will pay some of the costs
through higher water bills.
Controlling the levels of lead and arsenic in drinking water can be expensive. Significant capital investments are required to control drinking water
contaminants, and those costs are typically reflected in the rates that water
utilities charge their customers.129 In most states, poor Americans pay the

122

See id. at 223–24 (discussing the water crisis in Flint, Michigan).
See generally Drinking Water Contaminant Human Health Effects Information, EPA,
https://www.epa.gov/sdwa/drinking-water-contaminant-human-health-effects-information (last visited
Mar. 2, 2022) (listing resources exploring the human health impacts of various water contaminants).
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THE THURGOOD MARSHALL INSTIT., NAACP LEGAL DEF. AND EDUC. FUND, INC.,
WATER/COLOR: A STUDY OF RACE & THE WATER AFFORDABILITY CRISIS IN AMERICA’S CITIES 4, 26
(2019).
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Robert S. Raucher et al., Benefit-Cost Analysis for Drinking Water Standards: Efficiency, Equity,
and Affordability Considerations in Small Communities, J. BENEFIT-CROSS ANALYSIS (2011).
126
Arsenic and Cancer Risk, AME. CANCER SOC’Y, https://www.cancer.org/cancer/cancer-causes/arsenic.html (last visited March 4, 2022); Health Problems Caused by Lead, CDC (Dec. 8, 2021),
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same rates for water use as other Americans do.130 Insofar as drinking water
regulations cause an increase in the rates charged for drinking water, poor
households are burdened and may face an affordability issue.131
As was the case with auto tailpipe regulation, it is feasible for the EPA to
conduct benefit-cost analysis from the perspective of the poor as well as for
everyone. Ultimately, the EPA needs better information about contaminant
exposure and adverse health effects among poor households, the willingness
of the poor to pay higher rates for water-quality improvements, and the structure and dynamics of water utility bills as they impact the poor.
CONCLUSION
Under current practice, federal agencies rarely analyze the impact of rulemaking on the poor. Agencies should be required by OIRA to analyze how
the poor will be impacted. If the federal rulemaking process has society-wide
net benefits but hurts the poor, OIRA should work with the agency to modify
the design of the rule or provide federal funding to make the rule a good deal
for the impacted poor. If a rule or regulation hurts society but helps the poor,
the ramifications are more complex. Legally, it may be difficult for the
agency to defend such a rule without a statutory authorization for environmental justice. Nonetheless, if the society-wide analysis is a close call, but
slightly negative, it may be wise to proceed with the rule if it offers compelling net benefits for the poor.
This article’s proposal has been framed in the context of the welfare of
poor Americans, which are generally accepted as an important group to consider from an environmental justice perspective. This analysis makes a practical argument for starting the justice innovation with a focus on the poor
broadly before covering each of the various subpopulations that have experienced injustice. This article argues for reform of the federal rulemaking process. The proposal adds a second prong to the society-wide benefit-cost test
in regulatory impact analysis: the agency must also estimate the benefits and
costs of the rulemaking among the poor and demonstrate that the benefits to
the poor justify the costs to the poor. The addition of this second prong provides a direct avenue for environmental justice information to enter the formal process of regulatory impact analysis.
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A. Feasibility
This analysis explored two short case studies, one about clean air and the
other about safe drinking water, to illustrate how agencies would perform
benefit-cost analysis of regulations that impact the poor. This article concludes that the analysis is technically feasible if federal agencies invest in the
new data collection that would be required to perform the poverty-focused
analyses. OIRA will need to cooperate in the new data collection, as the Paperwork Reduction Act provides OIRA authority to approve or disapprove
all new information collections proposed by federal agencies.
B. Is the proposal lawful?
OIRA already has authority from Congress to issue technical guidance on
regulatory impact analysis. The proposal could be incorporated into the forthcoming Biden administration modernization of OMB Circular A-4 (2003),
which instructs agency analysts on how regulatory impact analyses should be
conducted.132
C. Is the proposal politically viable?
This proposal may not be politically viable because the positions of progressives and conservatives are difficult to predict and may be related to how
the proposal is framed by the Biden administration. The proposal may not be
dramatic enough to satisfy some progressive advocates of regulatory reform.
The administration might be inclined to support an income-weighted social
welfare function; income weighting, though theoretically appealing, has
shortcomings from a legal and political perspective. Some progressives might
prefer to eliminate benefit-cost analysis entirely, but such a radical change
would not likely be durable.
The reactions of conservatives to the proposal are even more difficult to
predict and may depend on details of how the proposal is framed when it is
proposed. Many low-income whites, which are part of the conservative base,
may by sympathetic with the proposal. If conservatives opposed the proposal,
they could not stop the Biden administration from adopting it and implementing it. Once the Biden administration has implemented the new approach for
a year or two, I doubt that a new Republican administration would make the
effort to repeal it because other initiatives would have a higher priority in a
new Republican administration.
In summary, formal regulatory impact analysis in the federal government
currently focuses on comparing society-wide benefits of a rule to societywide costs of the rule. I have proposed an additional equity comparison:
whether the rule will make America’s poor better off or worse off. The
132

Modernizing Regulatory Review, 86 Fed. Reg. 15 (Jan. 26, 2021).
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proposal is feasible for the agencies and OIRA to implement and is consistent
with President Biden’s regulatory modernization agenda.
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